Thursday, October 12, 2006

Much Ado About Lidle

Ever since Eric Lidle earned his place in aviation history yesterday, I've had more than one person ask me what I thought happened. At first it sounded like a typical VFR into IFR scenario-- inexperienced pilot without an instrument rating suddenly finds himself in the clouds and gets disoriented. Also referred to as the JFK Jr. scenario. Tonight, however, I came across this story which sheds a little more light on what happened. It also happens to be the most balanced, unsensationalistic analysis of a high profile aviation accident I've ever seen in the mainstream media.

The aircraft that Mr. Lidle was piloting was a 2002 Cirrus SR-20. Except for some instrumentation differences, this is the exact same airplane I fly. The only really troubling aspect of this whole incident for me, besides the inevitable over reaction by know-nothing politicians, was the fact an instructor was in the cockpit with Lidle. It just makes the whole tragedy seem that much more needless than it already was.

I was going to write about the many inaccuracies being reported by the media regarding this incident, but they are so many it's pointless to even try. There is one widely reported, oft repeated fallacy, however, that I will address. Contrary to what many news stories are saying, light aircraft flying up and down the Hudson or East Rivers do talk to ATC if they are below 1,100 feet. The charts I have for the New York metro area clearly state "although arriving aircraft may be operating beneath the floor of class B airspace on initial contact, communications should be established with approach control" whether they've filed a flight plan or not. They also indicate VFR aircraft operating below 2000 feet in the vicinity of where Lidle crashed need to contact La Guardia or JFK control towers.

Still, I can understand how many non-pilots might wonder why the FAA has allowed small aircraft to continue to fly so close to Manhattan with relatively light supervision. The answer is simple. A light private aircraft does not pose a serious threat as a weapon of mass destruction. The payloads are too small to carry any amount of explosives that could do serious damage and their slight mass and relatively slow airspeeds make them poor projectiles. Also, private airplane operaters know their passengers and cargo making the probability of a hijacking slim to none. Plus, it's very difficult to "blend in" at a small airport. AOPA's Airport Watch program has gone a long way into helping the smaller out-of-the-way airports tighten security.

All that said, it still doesn't change the fact that the biggest challenge to the public's perception of private aviation is not an ignorant press corp, but the errant pilots who give them something to talk about now and then.

2 comments:

Marty McKee said...

Not being flip, just asking a question. What's there to stop somebody from loading 500 pounds of dynamite onto one of these planes and flying it smack into a building? Instead of hijacking the plane, couldn't they just steal it or just buy one? Lidle owned his. Couldn't Lidle have just as easily been carrying a bomb (yes, I know he's no terrorist and his crash was an accident)?

Uncle Larry said...

I mention this in the post. The useful load of one of these planes is not big enough to carry the amount of dynamite or fertilizer or whatever to cause any serious damage. A Cirrus SR-20 with a 200 lb. pilot would barely be able to take off with 500 lbs or explosives. And if it could, getting the explosives on the airport or loading it in a plane without drawing A LOT of suspicion would be tough. The typical small airport is not like an airline terminal with thousands of transient strangers. Everyone is very familiar with what aircraft are based there and who flies them. It's very hard to blend in at a small airport. If you were overly secretive or seen unloading all kinds of strange looking boxes in your hangar nowadays, you'd almost certainly receive a visit from airport police or the local authorities.

Now,for the sake of argument, if someone did manage to elude detection and struggle into the air with a load of explosives the relatively slow airspeeds and small mass of a light airplane would not, as was unfortunately demonstrated by Mr. Lidle, penetrate a structure enough to allow the explosion to be very effective. It would certainly do a lot more damage than Lidle did, but knock a building down? I seriously doubt it.

The terrorists know this too. If they thought for an instant they could do that kind of damage with a small plane, the 9/11 hijackers would've tried something in flight school where they had access to small airplanes every day.